

Message Text

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42

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14

EUR-25 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 DRC-01 /164 W

----- 109934

P R 121554Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0970

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 10251

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPARTMENT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DRAFT OF PRESENTATION FOR 13 DEC

PLENARY

AD HOC GROUP ON DEC 11 APPROVED DRAFT ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION

OF TEXT WHICH WILL BE PRESENTED BY BELGIAN REP (ADRIAENSSEN)

AT THE DEC 13 PLENARY IN THE FRENCH LANGUAGE. TEXT FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

1. ON THE EVE OF THE HOLIDAY RECESS, MY COLLEAGUES AND
I FEEL THAT IT IS THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT TO LOOK BACK

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AND TAKE STOCK OF THE FIRST WEEKS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

2. WHEN CONSIDERING THE GROUND COVERED SINCE 30 OCT, WE HAVE REASON FOR SOME SATISFACTION. OUR NEGOTIATIONS HAVE STARTED WELL. THE WORK HAS BEEN APPROACHED WITH SERIOUS INTENT AND OUR ACTIVITY HAS PROCEEDED SMOOTHLY. THIS UNDERLINES THE USEFULNESS OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS. OUR ACTIVITY OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS HAS CONFIRMED OUR COMMON WILL TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

3. THE ALLIED APPROACH, WHICH WE BELIEVE FULFILLS THE PRINCIPLES AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS, IS WIDELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES. NEVERTHELESS, OUR PROCEEDINGS HAVE SHOWN EVIDENCE OF THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH ALL PARTICIPANTS HAVE BEGUN THE TASK. I WANTED TO STRESS THIS POSITIVE AND IMPORTANT POINT AT THE OUTSET.

4. AMONG THE POINTS ON WHICH WE DIFFER AND WHERE WE SOULD LIKE TO SEE BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, THERE IS ONE WHICH STANDS OUT. ON THE EASTERN SIDE, IT IS POSTULATED THAT THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES MUST BE PRESERVED UNCHANGED, ALTHOUGH AT LOWER LEVELS, BECAUSE IT REPRESENTS A SO TO SPEAK ORGANIC OUTCOME OF A HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT. IF WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THE ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES -- AND WE HAVE PAID CAREFUL ATTENTION TO WHAT THEY HAVE SAID -- THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES REPRESENTS THE BEST POSSIBLE SITUATION BECAUSE IT HAS LAID THE FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN DETENTE, AND ABOVE ALL BECAUSE THAT RELATIONSHIP APPEARS TO THEM AS THE END PRODUCT AS IT WERE OF A POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT UPON WHICH HISTORY HAD STAMPED ITS SEAL OF APPROVAL. THE RECENT HISTORY OF EUROPE HAS CONTAINED PERIODS WE SHOULD NOT LIKE TO GO THROUGH AGAIN. WE DO NOT, THEREFORE, BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION AS IT RESULTED FROM VARIOUS HISTORICAL FACTORS CANNOT BE CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. QUITE TO THE CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE THAT IT CAN AND SHOULD BE IMPROVED. WHY SHOULD WE MODEL OURSELVES ON THE PAST WHEN WE ARE CALLED ON TO PREPARE THE FUTURE?
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5. FOR OUR PART, RATHER THAN TAKING A RIGID CONCEPTION OF HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AS OUR GUIDE, WE HAVE CHOSEN TO TAKE A PRAGMATIC APPROACH. THUS OUR PROPOSALS SPRING FROM A WISH TO TACKLE DIRECTLY THAT WHICH SEEMS TO US LESS THAN PERFECT, OR PRECARIOUS, IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN EUROPE. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT IN SO DOING WE SHALL BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN THE FOUNDATION ON WHICH A

DURABLE DETENTE MUST REST.

6. WE THUS DESIRE TO BE BOTH SPECIFIC AND EFFECTIVE. THIS LEADS US TO CONCENTRATE ON THE MOST NOTABLE FACTORS MAKING FOR INSTABILITY IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NAMELY, THE SIGNIFICANT DISPROPORTION IN SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES ON EACH SIDE AND IN THEIR REINFORCEMENT CAPABILITY RELEVANT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING IS QUITE SIMPLY TO END THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. WE PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH A SITUATION OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN HAVE GOOD REASON TO FEEL THAT THEIR SECURITY WAS STRENGTHENED.

7. TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FOCUS IN A FIRST PHASE ON THE FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THESE TWO COUNTRIES ARE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO DETENTE. WE ALSO PROPOSE THAT WE DIRECT OUR EFFORTS TO GROUND FORCES. THESE CONSTITUTE THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY ELEMENT. AMONG GROUND FORCES WE DEVOTE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO TANKS WHICH ARE THE SPEARHEAD OF ANY ACTION BY GROUND FORCES. SOME SPEAKERS HAVE TAKEN US TO TASK FOR HAVING EXCLUDED FROM OUR PROPOSALS AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BUT TO ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD INTRODUCE GREAT ADDITIONAL COMPLEXITIES INTO THESE

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EUR-25 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 DRC-01 /164 W

----- 109994

P R 121554Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 971
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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NEGOTIATIONS AND WOULD BLUR THE AGREED FOCUS ON CENTRAL EUROPE. REALISM AND THE NEED FOR CONCRETE RESULTS REQUIRE US TO LIMIT OUR GOALS IN ORDER TO GIVE US A BETTER CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THEM. THAT WOULD BE PRECISELY THE EFFECT OF OUR PROPOSALS.

8. OUR APPROACH IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AS SET FORTH IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28. INSTEAD OF ENSHRINING A SECURITY SITUATION WHICH FROM ANY POINTS OF VIEW IS UNSATISFACTORY, WE ARE IN FACT STRIVING FOR INCREASED SECURITY FOR ALL THROUGH ENHANCED STABILITY. THIS IS WHY OUR REDUCTION PROPOSALS ARE DESIGNED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE IMPORTANT DISPARITIES IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR REDUCTIONS ARE NOT AN END IN THEMSELVES. IT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES RESULTING FROM REDUCTIONS WHICH COUNTS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF ENHANCING STABILITY AND CONFIDENTIAL

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STRENGTHENING SECURITY.

9. MOREOVER, REDUCTIONS BY THEMSELVES WOULD NOT BRING US TO THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES. THERE IS AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT, WHICH THE JUNE 28 COMMUNIQUE RECOGNIZED IN THE AGREED DESCRIPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, FOR ASSOCIATED MEASURES WHOSE AIM IS PRECISELY TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS ACHIEVE THEIR REAL OBJECTIVE. AND THAT OBJECTIVE IS NOT SIMPLY TO PERPETUATE THE RISKS INHERENT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, THOUGH AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES, BUT TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE WHERE CONFIDENCE IS REAL AND PERCEPTIBLE TO PUBLIC OPINION.

10. TURNING TO ANOTHER ASPECT OF OUR WORK, WE ARE ALL AGREED THAT AGREEMENTS REACHED SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A DIMINUTION OF THE SECURITY OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES. MORE THAN THAT, THE SECURITY OF THOSE COUNTRIES -- AND INDEED OF ALL THE NATIONS IN EUROPE -- WOULD EVEN BE STRENGTHENED BY THE ADOPTION OF OUR PROPOSALS.

11. A QUESTION WAS RAISED IN THE DECEMBER 5 SESSION CONCERNING THE BEARING OF WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON THESE NEGOTIATIONS. OUR POSITION ON THIS POINT IS CLEAR. AMBASSADOR QUARLES, IN HIS NOVEMBER 6 PRESENTATION, STATED THAT THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO ESTABLISH A EUROPEAN UNION BY 1980 IS A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP IN EUROPE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE UNIFICATION OF THE NINETEEN WESTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE. THIS IS WHY MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS TO WHICH WE EVENTUALLY SUBSCRIBE ARE SO FRAMED AS NOT TO HINDER IN ANY WAY THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

12. MR. CHAIRMAN, THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE SUBMITTED ARE LOGICAL AND REALISTIC. THEY ENABLE US TO TACKLE THE PROBLEMS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN A CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL FASHION. IN PROPOSING TO REACH OUR COMMON CEILING GOAL IN TWO SEPARATE PHASES, IT IS NOT OUR INTENTION TO LIMIT REDUCTIONS TO SOVIET AND U.S. FORCES
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ALONE. OUR AIM IS TO FACILITATE SOLUTIONS BY CONCENTRATING IN A FIRST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH FROM ALL VIEWPOINTS, INCLUDING THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW, SEEM TO US MOST SUSCEPTIBLE OF SOLUTION. THIS MEANS DEALING WITH U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND AGREEING ON THE CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING.

IF WE ARE SUCCESSFUL OUR EFFORT WILL CREATE THE NECESSARY CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE FOR PROCEEDING TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH WE PROPOSE TO INCLUDE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE SECOND PHASE WILL BE NECESSARY TO COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE COMMON CEILING WHICH IS CENTRAL TO OUR PROPOSALS. THIS SHOULD SET AT REST THE MINDS OF THOSE WHO HAVE APPEARED TO DOUBT OUR INTENTIONS.

13. THE DISCUSSION WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE HERE OVER THE PAST SIX WEEKS HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT, IF THERE IS ONE POINT ON WHICH ALL CAN AGREE, IT IS THAT THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS COMPLEX. THE PARTICIPANTS WERE ALREADY AWARE OF THIS LAST SPRING WHEN THEY AGREED THAT "IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AN UNDERSTANDING SHOULD BE REACHED TO CONDUCT THEM IN SUCH A WAY AS TO ENSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND THOROUGH APPROACH TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, WITH DUE

REGARD TO ITS COMPLEXITY." WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AROUND
THIS TABLE OVER THE PAST WEEKS HAS, I AM SURE, IMPRESSED
ALL OF US EVEN MORE WITH THE NECESSITY OF FINDING SOME
MANAGEABLE AND PRODUCTIVE WAY OF COMING TO GRIPS WITH
THE CONCRETE SUBJECT MATTER. THAT IS WHY A RELATIVELY
SIMPLE APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT MATTER IS BEST. MY
COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE PROPOSED SUCH AN APPROACH. WE
SUGGEST THAT WE SHOULD ENGAGE IN DETAILED DISCUSSIONS
OF OUR FIRST PHASE PROPOSALS, AND HOPE THAT THIS APPROACH
WILL BE FOLLOWED WHEN WE TAKE UP OUR WORK AGAIN IN THE
NEW YEAR. END TEXT.MOWINCKEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, AGREEMENT DRAFT, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, PEACE TALKS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 DEC 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: hilburpw
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973VIENNA10251
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731228/aaaaauog.tel
Line Count: 288
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: hilburpw
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <29-Aug-2001 by izenbei0>; APPROVED <01-Oct-2001 by hilburpw>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: DRAFT OF PRESENTATION FOR 13 DEC PLENARY
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005